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Abstract 
This is the first paper to estimate the effect of teacher strikes on student long-run educational 
attainment and labor market outcomes. We exploit cross-cohort variation in the prevalence of 
teacher strikes within and across provinces in Argentina in a difference-in-difference 
framework to examine how exposure to teacher strikes during primary school affects long-run 
outcomes. We find robust evidence that teacher strikes worsen the labor market outcomes of 
these individuals when they are between the ages of 30 and 40: being exposed to the average 
incidence of teacher strikes during primary school (88 days) reduces annual labor market 
earnings by 2.99 percent. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this amounts to an 
aggregate earnings loss of $712 million in Argentina annually. This is equivalent to the cost 
of raising the average annual employment income of all primary school teachers in Argentina 
by 19 percent. We also find evidence of a decline in hourly wage, an increase in 
unemployment, an increase in the probability of not working or studying and a decline in the 
skill levels of the occupations into which students sort. Examining short- and long-run 
educational outcomes suggests that the labor market effects are driven, at least in part, by a 
reduction in educational attainment. Our analysis further identifies significant 
intergenerational treatment effects. Children of adults who were exposed to teacher strikes 
during primary school also experience adverse educational attainment effects.  
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1. Introduction   
Teacher industrial action is a prevalent feature of public education systems across the globe; 
during the past few years teacher strikes have been observed in countries as diverse as 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Russia, Spain and the United States (e.g. Seattle, East St. Louis, Pasco, 
Prospect Heights and Chicago). A shared belief among policymakers across several of these 
countries is that teacher strikes are detrimental to student learning due to its negative effect on 
instructional time (Baker 2013). In some countries this sentiment has led to the enactment of 
legislation that severely restricts teachers’ right to strike. 4  However, the effect of such 
restrictions on student outcomes is theoretically ambiguous because teacher strikes can also 
result in better working conditions that motivate teachers and raise their productivity. Despite 
this theoretical ambiguity, there is a lack of empirical research that credibly and 
comprehensively evaluates how teacher strikes affect student outcomes.  
In this paper, we construct a new data set on teacher strikes in Argentina and use this to  
present the first evidence in the literature on the long-run educational attainment and labor 
market effects of teacher strikes. Between 1983 and 2014 Argentina experienced a total of 
1,500 teacher strikes, with substantial variation across time and provinces, making this an 
interesting case for the study of teacher strikes. We analyze the relationship between exposure 
to strikes during primary school and relevant education, labor market and other 
socioeconomic outcomes when the affected cohorts are between 30 and 40 years old.5 We 
also investigate if the effects that we estimate carry over to these individuals’ children.  
To identify the effect of teacher strikes, we rely on a cross-cohort difference-in-
difference method that examines how education and labor market outcomes changed among 
adults who were exposed to more days of teacher strikes during primary school compared to 
adults who were exposed to fewer days of teacher strikes during primary school. The sources 
of variation we exploit therefore come from within-province differences in strike exposure 
across birth cohorts and within-cohort differences in strike exposure across provinces.  
The main identifying assumptions underlying our estimation strategy are that there are 
no shocks (or other policies) contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially affect 
                                                 
 
4 For example, even though 33 states in the US have passed duty-to-bargain laws that require districts to negotiate with a 
union (if teachers have elected one for the purpose of collective bargaining), only 13 states allow teachers to go on strike in 
the event of a bargaining impasse (Colasanti 2008).   
5 We focus on this age range because existing literature suggests that labor market outcomes at this age are informative about 
lifetime labor market outcomes (e.g. Haider and Solon 2006) 
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the various cohorts and that the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in 
outcomes across birth cohorts within each province. We show extensive evidence that our 
data are consistent with these assumptions. In particular, our results are robust to controlling 
for local labor market conditions, including province-specific linear time trends, accounting 
for cross-province mobility, excluding regions with persistently high frequencies of teacher 
strikes, and controlling for province-specific non-teacher strikes. This suggests that our 
estimates are not driven by province-specific variation in macroeconomic performance across 
time and that there are no shocks contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially 
affect the various cohorts. We also show that the effects we identify disappear when 
reassigning treatment to cohorts that have just graduated from primary school, indicating that 
the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts 
within each province. 
We find robust evidence that teacher strikes worsen future labor market outcomes: 
being exposed to the average incidence of teacher strikes during primary school (88 days) 
reduces annual labor market earnings and wages for 30-40 year olds by 2.99 percent and 2.22 
percent, respectively. Based on these results, the implied rate of return to an additional year of 
primary education in Argentina (180 days) is 6.1 percent. The prevalence of teacher strikes in 
Argentina means that the effect on the economy as a whole is substantial: A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests an aggregate annual earnings loss of $712 million. This is 
equivalent to the cost of raising the average employment income of all primary school 
teachers in Argentina by 19 percent. 
In addition to adverse wage and earnings effects, our results reveal negative effects of 
teacher strikes on several other education and labor market dimensions as well. Specifically, 
our results indicate that being exposed to the average incidence of teacher strikes during 
primary school leads to a 0.70 of a percentage point increase in unemployment (11.44 percent 
relative to the mean) and a 1.58 percentage point increase in the probability of not working or 
studying (7.92 percent relative to the mean). We also find evidence that teacher strikes causes 
individuals to sort into lower-skilled occupations later in life. Examining short- and long-run 
educational outcomes demonstrate that these adverse labor market effects are driven, at least 
in part, by a reduction in educational attainment: being exposed to the average incidence of 
teacher strikes during primary school leads to a reduction in years of education by 1.84 
percent relative to the mean. Finally, we document significant intergenerational treatment 
effects: children of individuals exposed to teacher strikes during primary school suffer 
negative educational attainment effects as well.  
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Our results further demonstrate that teacher strikes affect men and women very 
differently. For males, exposure to teacher strikes leads to a reduction in educational 
attainment, an increase in the likelihood of being unemployed, occupational downgrading, 
and has adverse effects on earnings as well as wages. For females, teacher strikes reduce 
educational attainment in a way similar to that of men. We find a reduction in the level of 
earnings among females as well, but teacher strikes do not affect the wages of females who 
are employed. We show that this is because teacher strikes induce females to sort into home 
production (defined as neither working nor studying). Our analysis reveals that teacher strikes 
affect women on several additional socioeconomic dimensions as well. Specifically, females 
exposed to teacher strikes during primary school have more children, less educated partners, 
and lower per capita family income. We argue that some of these effects are driven by a 
decline in female’s bargain power within the household.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First, no other 
paper has examined the effects of teacher strikes on student long-run outcomes. Given the 
large literature demonstrating that short-run program effects on student outcomes can be very 
different from any effects on long-run outcomes, this is of great value to policy makers (e.g., 
Chetty et al. 2011; Deming et al. 2013; Lovenheim and Willén 2016). Second, the frequency 
and prevalence of teacher strikes that we exploit is much greater than that which has been 
used in earlier studies. This allows us to obtain more precise estimates, and examine a richer 
set of outcomes, compared to what has been done before. Third, this paper makes use of a 
novel data set which we have created based on information from annual business reports on 
the Argentine economy. This data is a great tool for other researchers interested in questions 
centering on teacher strikes and industrial action.     
It is important to highlight that the pervasive level of teacher strikes during our analysis 
period is not a deviation from the norm in Argentina, and current student cohorts are exposed 
to similar levels of strikes. This cements the relevance of our paper and highlights the urgency 
of implementing reforms that reduce the prevalence of teacher strikes in the country. One 
policy could be to introduce labor contracts that extend over several years, and only allow 
teachers to strike if a bargaining impasse is reached when renewing these multi-year 
contracts. This would eliminate sporadic teacher strikes while still allowing teachers to use 
industrial action as a tool to ensure fair contracts. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
education system in Argentina and offers theoretical predictions of how teacher strikes may 
affect student outcomes; Section 3 discusses pre-existing research; Section 4 introduces the 
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data; Section 5 presents our empirical strategy; Section 6 discusses our results; and Section 7 
concludes.   
 
2. Background & Theoretical Predictions of Teacher Strikes 
2.1 The Argentinian Education System  
Education in Argentina is the responsibility of the provinces and consists of four levels: 
kindergarten, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education. 6  Primary 
education begins the calendar year in which the number of days the child is 6 years old is 
maximized, and comprises the first seven years of schooling. Prior to the implementation of 
the Federal Education Law in 1998 (approved in 1993), only primary education was 
mandatory in Argentina (Alzúa et al. 2015). Since then, compulsory schooling has grown to 
include secondary education as well, increasing the length of mandatory education from 7 to 
12 years. Public education is financed through a revenue-sharing system between the 
provinces and the federal government which is funded by taxpayers, and is free at all levels.    
The fraction of students that attended private school at the primary level during our 
analysis period was approximately 0.2, and this fraction was held relatively constant across 
the years that we examine. Since 2003, however, private enrollment at the primary and 
secondary level has increased substantially. Existing research suggests that this increase is 
driven by high- and middle-income families, leading to an increase in socioeconomic school 
segregation (Gasparini et al. 2011; Jaume 2013).7 
 
2.2 Teacher Strikes in Argentina  
The presence of unions, collective bargaining and labor strikes in Argentina can be traced 
back to the early years of the 20th century, except for the years during which the country was 
subject to military dictatorships (Confederacion de Educadores Argentinos 2009). During the 
dictatorships (the most recent one lasting from 1976 to 1983), labor strikes were prohibited 
and collective bargaining limited. Following the reinstatement of democracy in 1983, 
industrial action has quickly regained its status as a pervasive feature of the Argentine labor 
                                                 
 
6 Primary education was decentralized in 1978 and secondary education was decentralized in 1992. However, the national 
government remains highly involved in terms of setting curriculum, regulations and financing.  
7 A commonly held belief is that individuals perceive private education as superior due to the fact that teacher strikes are 
much less pronounced at private institutions, but existing literature finds no effect of teacher strikes on the likelihood of 
being enrolled at a public institution (Narodowski and Moschetti 2015). We examine this in detail in Section 6.4. 
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market. Since then, public sector teachers have been the most active social protesters in the 
country, and current estimates suggest that they make up approximately 35 percent of all 
labor strikes in Argentina (Chiappe 2011; Etchemendy 2013). In comparison, private school 
teachers account for less than 4 percent of all labor strikes in the country. The occupation with 
the second largest incidence of labor strikes in modern times is public administration, 
accounting for approximately 25 percent of all strikes (Chiappe 2011; Etchemendy 2013).      
Teacher unions are typically organized at the provincial level, and variation in teacher 
strikes across time and provinces is substantial. On average, provinces have lost 372 
instructional days due to teacher strikes between 1983 and 2014 (6.7 percent of total 
instructional days), ranging from 188 days (3.3 percent) in La Pampa to 531 days (9.5 
percent) in Rio Negro, with a standard deviation of 109 days.8 The pervasive level of teacher 
strikes during our analysis period is not a deviation from the norm in Argentina, and current 
students are exposed to similar levels of teacher industrial action. This highlights the 
importance and relevance of our results. Figure 1 shows the variation in the number of days of 
teacher strikes by province during the period 1977 and 2014, and Figure 2 displays the the 
number of strikes by province during the same period (a strike can last for a couple of hours 
or for several weeks).  
 Although there is no existing research that investigates the effect of teacher strikes on 
student outcomes in Argentina, several studies have attempted to disentangle the factors 
underlying the prevalence of teacher strikes in the country. The results are mixed: Murillo and 
Ronconi (2004) finds that teacher strikes are more common in provinces where union density 
is high and political relations with the local government is tense, while Narodowski and 
Moschetti (2015) concludes that days of teacher strikes display an erratic behavior without 
any discernable trends or explanations. What these two studies have in common is that they 
both emphasize the lack of a relationship between local labor market conditions and teacher 
strikes. This result is important for our empirical strategy since our main identification 
assumption is that there are no shocks contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially 
affect the different cohorts (this assumption is explored in detail in Section 6.3).  
In summary, this section first described the prevalence of teacher strikes in Argentina 
since 1983. It then showed that there is substantial variation in teacher strikes across 
provinces in any given year and across years in any given province. Finally, it pointed to prior 
                                                 
 
8 There are 180 instructional days per year in Argentina. The total number of instructional days between 1983 and 2014 is 
therefore 5,760. 372 out of 5,760 is 0.067, or 6.7 percent.   
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findings in the literature that indicates that teacher strikes in Argentina likely are not driven 
by local labor market conditions. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Predictions 
The main way in which teacher strikes can affect student outcomes is by reducing the time 
students spend in school. Theoretical as well as empirical research of education production 
provide clear predictions about the consequences of reduced instructional time: lower 
academic achievement (Cahan and David 1987; Cahan and Cohen 1989; Neal and Johnson 
1996; Lee and Barro 2001; Gormley and Gayer 2005; Cascio and Lewis 2006; Luyten 2006; 
Pischke 2007; Marcotte 2007; Sims 2008; Marcotte and Helmet 2008; Hansen 2008; Leuven 
et al. 2010; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; Rivkin and Schiman 2013; Goodman 2014). However, 
teacher strikes may not only affect student outcomes through lost instructional time, and it 
would be incorrect to attempt to predict the likely consequences of teacher strikes by solely 
referencing these studies.9  
In addition to reducing effective instructional time, teacher strikes can (1) affect teacher 
effort, (2) alter resource levels and allocation, (3) affect academic expectations and graduation 
requirements, (5) alter the value of a diploma, (6) change the value differential between a 
public and a private degree, and (7) change the composition of teachers. The direction and 
magnitude of the effects flowing through these different channels will depend on the nature 
and outcome of the strike. For example, if the unions go on strike to raise wages and are 
successful, the strike will likely lead to an increase in teacher effort and productivity. This 
could also lead to an improvement in the composition of the teacher workforce in the long-
run.10 However, if the strike is in effect for several months before the two sides reach an 
agreement, academic expectations and graduation requirements may be adjusted downwards 
with the potential implications of a reduction in the value of a diploma and an increase in the 
value differential between a public and a private degree. Further, the increase in teacher pay 
may be financed through a reallocation of resources from other inputs that enter the education 
production function, and this can lead to a reduction in educational quality. The effect of 
                                                 
 
9 Many of the predictions of the effects of teacher strikes are related to the underlying reasons for teachers to strike. It is 
therefore difficult to determine the generalizability of our results to other countries and settings, as teachers in for example 
the US may strike for other reasons than those that lead teachers in Argentina to strike. In a companion paper with Gustavo 
Torrents (Indiana University), we build a political economy model that aspires to identify the most common drivers of 
teacher strikes in Argentina. The outcome of that paper should be used to determine the generalizability of the results in the 
current paper to other countries and settings.   
10 This would take time and highlights the importance of analyzing long-run effects. 
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teacher strikes on education production can thus be both positive and negative. The resulting 
predictions of the effects of teacher industrial action on student outcomes are therefore 
ambiguous.  
Two additional factors augment this theoretical ambiguity. First, there may be 
substantial treatment heterogeneity across students. The most likely source of heterogeneity 
concerns the socioeconomic characteristics of the students’ families: wealthy parents will be 
able to move their children to private institutions if they believe the strikes to hurt their 
children. If this behavior is sufficiently pervasive it may lead to a segregated school system 
with additional adverse effects on the students from poor families that are left behind. This 
effect may be further augmented if teachers from poorer districts are more likely to join 
teacher unions and participate in strikes. Another source of treatment heterogeneity relates to 
when during primary school children are exposed to strikes. Ample research suggests that 
younger children are more susceptible to policy interventions in general, and children who 
lose several weeks of instructional time in first grade may therefore suffer more than children 
who lose the same amount of days in the final grade of primary school (Shonkoff and Meisels 
2000; Cunha and Heckman 2007; Doyle et al. 2009; Chetty et al. 2015).  
Second, teacher strikes may have important effects on non-educational outcomes. The 
reason is that teacher strikes reduce effective instructional time. Unless parents can make 
alternative educational arrangements (which will depend on whether it was an expected or 
unexpected strike, and on the resources that the parents possess), this will lead to an increase 
in leisure time and to an increase in the risk of engaging in bad behavior and criminal activity 
(e.g. Anderson 2014; Henry et al. 1999). This can directly impact the future education and 
labor market outcomes of children. 
The above discussion demonstrates that teacher strikes reduce instructional time, and 
existing models make clear that reductions in instructional time negatively impact student 
learning. However, the discussion also makes clear that strikes can affect students through a 
number of other channels, and that the magnitude and direction of those effects depend on the 
cause and outcome of the strike. In addition, there may be substantial treatment heterogeneity 
associated with teacher strikes. Therefore, the net effect of teacher strikes on long-run 
educational attainment and labor market outcomes is ambiguous. This underscores the 
importance of the empirical analysis presented here.  
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3. Prior Literature on Teacher Strikes 
The majority of the existing research on teacher strikes is cross sectional with identification 
strategies that are vulnerable to omitted variable bias (Caldwell and Maskalski 1981; 
Caldwell and Jefferys 1983; Zirkel 1992 Thornicroft 1994; Zwerling 2008; Johnson 2009). 
Specifically, students, teachers and schools subject to strikes may be systematically different 
from those that are not exposed to strikes on dimensions that we cannot observe. If these 
differences have independent effects on the outcomes that are being examined, this will 
confound the estimated effect of teacher strikes on outcomes. Further, these studies have 
focused exclusively on contemporaneous education effects (test scores) of teacher strikes that 
are of very short duration. These two factors significantly limit our understanding of the 
consequences associated with teacher industrial action. This is particularly the case given the 
large literature suggesting that short-run program effects on student outcomes can be different 
from any effects on long-run outcomes (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011; Deming et al. 2013; 
Lovenheim and Willén 2016). 
Abstracting away from potential identification issues, the results from the above studies 
are mixed. While some studies find no association between strikes and student outcomes (e.g. 
Zwerling 2008; Thornicroft 1994; Zirkel 1992), others find marginally statistically significant 
and negative effects (e.g. Johnson 2009; Caldwell and Maskalski 1981 and Caldwell and 
Jefferys 1983). Taken together, these studies suggest that the anti-strike bans imposed in 
numerous countries across the globe are marginally justified at best.   
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies that look at the effect of teacher strikes 
on student outcomes have relied on research designs that are not cross sectional: Belot and 
Webbink (2010) and Baker (2013). Belot and Webbink (2010) exploit an institutional reform 
in Belgium in 1990 that led to substantial and frequent strikes in the French-speaking 
community but not in the Flemish-speaking community of the country. Using a difference-in-
difference approach that compares the difference in educational outcomes between 
individuals in school to those not in school in the French-speaking community to that same 
difference in the Flemish-speaking community, the authors find some evidence in favor of 
teacher strikes causing a reduction in educational attainment and an increase in class 
repetition. Though interesting, this study is not able to examine if the identified education 
effects carry over to the labor market, if there are other non-educational effects of teacher 
strikes or if there are intergenerational treatment effects. Further, the point estimates in Belot 
and Webbink (2010) provide the intent-to-treat effect of exposure to all strikes in 1990 among 
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students in all grade school years. This makes it difficult to extrapolate the marginal effect of 
teacher strikes on students in specific school grade years.  
Baker (2013) evaluates the effect of teacher strikes on student achievement in Ontario 
by comparing the change in test score between grade 3 and 6 for cohorts exposed to a strike to 
the corresponding change for cohorts that were not subject to a strike. The results suggest that 
strikes that lasted for more than 10 days and took place in grade 5 or 6 have statistically and 
economically significant negative effects on test score growth, while strikes that occurred in 
grades 2 or 3 do not have statistically or economically significant effects. The research design 
used by Baker (2013) is less exposed to omitted variable problems than the abovementioned 
studies as it allows the author to control for unobserved factors provided that they are fixed at 
the school or student cohort level. However, data limitations prevent the author from 
examining long-run educational attainment and labor market effects – one of the main 
contributions of the current analysis.  
To summarize, the majority of the existing research on teacher strikes is cross sectional 
with identification strategies that are vulnerable to omitted variable bias. More current papers 
rely on identification strategies less susceptible to such econometric issues, but limited 
variation in teacher strikes coupled with lack of good outcome data has led these studies to 
only examine the educational effects of teacher strikes in the short- and medium-term. There 
is no existing research that has explored the long-run educational attainment and labor market 
effects of exposure to teacher strikes. Further, no study has been able to examine if there are 
intergenerational treatment effects associated with teacher strike exposure, and no existing 
analysis has examined potential nonlinear and heterogeneous treatment effects of teacher 
strikes. These gaps in the literature prevent us from fully understanding the dynamics of 
teacher industrial action, and whether the net effect of such policies is beneficial or harmful to 
students. This cements the importance of our empirical investigation on the topic.  
 
4. Data 
4.1 Teacher Strikes  
Data on teacher strikes by province and year are obtained from the annual reports on the 
Argentine economy published by Consejo Técnico de Inversiones (CTI). These annual reports 
provide province- and sector-specific information on labor strikes (duration and number of 
workers) per month, and we use information from 1977 to 1998 to construct our data set. We 
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assume that children begin school the calendar year they turn 6, and graduate from primary 
school at the age of 12. This means that we have information on exposure to teacher strikes 
while in primary school for children born between 1971 and 1985. The assumption that 
children attend primary school between the ages of 6 and 12 leads to some measurement error 
in treatment assignment because children start primary school the calendar year in which the 
number of days they are 6 years old is maximized.11 This assumption will thus cause a slight 
attenuation of our results. Using household survey data on the educational attainment of 6 
year olds between 2003-2015, we estimate that 70 percent of individuals in our sample are 
assigned to the right cohort. 
We restrict our analysis to strike exposure during primary school, rather than during 
primary and secondary school, for two reasons. First, our data shows that the fraction of 
individuals that completed secondary education during our analysis period was less than 0.6. 
If we include strike exposure during secondary school this means that we would assign the 
wrong treatment to more than 40 percent of the sample (as our analysis is based on aggregated 
birth year – birth province data). This would introduce an attenuation bias that makes the 
results difficult to interpret. Second, institutional features of the Argentinian education system 
make strikes less common at the secondary level, and while all strikes reported by CTI affect 
primary school teachers, only a fraction of them affect secondary school teachers. We cannot 
identify which fraction of the CTI-reported strikes that are relevant to secondary school 
teachers, and the treatment variable would therefore be very noisy at this level.   
Table 1 displays the cross-cohort variation in exposure to teacher strikes within and 
across provinces that we use as identifying variation. The table shows that there is substantial 
variation both within provinces over time and across provinces in any given year. Table 1 also 
shows that the average number of days of teacher strikes that these cohorts were exposed to 
during primary school is 40 (or 3.2 percent of primary school instructional days).12 If one 
takes national teacher strikes into account this number increases to 88 (or 6.98 percent of 
primary school instructional days).13 As discussed in Section 2, strikes were prohibited during 
the military junta of 1977-1983. This explains why the oldest cohorts in our sample are 
exposed to relatively fewer days of teacher strikes. 
  
                                                 
 
11 To precisely impute the number of strikes during primary schooling we would need information on the month and day that 
each child was born on, which is not available in the survey. 
12 Primary school in Argentina is comprised of 1260 instructional days, 180 days per year. 
13 We do not consider national teacher strikes when constructing our treatment measure as they are completely subsumed by 
the cohort fixed effects that we use. See Section 5.  
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4.2 Educational Attainment & Labor Market Outcomes   
Our outcome data come from the 2003-2015 waves of the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH), a household survey representative of the urban population of Argentina (91 percent of 
the total population). Our main analysis focuses on individuals between the ages of 30 and 40 
because these individuals have typically completed their education and are on a part of their 
earnings profile where their earnings are reflective of lifetime earnings (e.g. Haider and Solon 
2006; Böhlmark and Lindquist 2006). Table 2 shows the birth cohort that underlies each year 
and age combination that we use for our analysis and Figure 2 provides a visual depiction of 
the data structure for a subsample of birth cohorts. As shown in Table 2, the birth cohorts 
range from 1971 to 1985. These are the only cohorts that are between 30 and 40 years old 
when the outcomes are measured (2003-2015) for which we can perfectly calculate exposure 
to teacher strikes during primary school. This means that we do not have a balanced panel of 
age observations across the EPH waves. In Section 6.3 we show that limiting our analysis to 
EPH waves 2011-2015 for which we have a balanced panel has no impact on our results.   
Crucial to our identification strategy is our ability to link respondents to their province 
of birth, because teacher strikes may lead to selective sorting across provinces, especially if 
exposure to strikes affects school quality. Teacher strikes could also impact post-primary 
school mobility patterns if strike-induced education effects affect one’s access to national 
labor markets. Relying on birth province rather than current province of residence eliminates 
these endogenous migration issues. It is still the case that a fraction of respondents will be 
assigned the wrong treatment dose as families can move across provinces such that birth 
province is different from the province in which the child attended primary education.  
However, Table 3 shows that the province of residence is the same as the birth province for 
93 percent of 13 year olds in Argentina, and any bias resulting from this mobility is therefore 
likely to be very small. In Section 6.3 we further show that our results are robust to excluding 
the five provinces with the highest migration rates. 
To construct our analysis sample, we collapse the data on the birth province – birth year 
– EPH year level. Aggregation to this level is sensible because treatment varies on the birth 
province – birth year level. Table 4 provides summary statistics of the outcome variables we 
use in our analysis. For educational attainment, we generate dummy variables for completion 
of secondary education and for having obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree. These indicators 
are constructed from a years of education variable that we also use to examine the educational 
attainment effect of strike exposure. With respect to labor market outcomes, we look at the 
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proportion of people that are unemployed, out of the labor force and dedicated to home 
production (neither studying nor working). To construct a measure of occupational skill we 
follow Lovenheim and Willén (2016) and calculate the fraction of workers in each 3-digit 
occupation code that has more than a high school degree. We use this to rank occupations by 
skill level to examine if strike exposure leads individuals to sort into lower-skilled 
occupations.14 We also use the EPH measures of hours worked and earnings. With respect to 
earnings, we consider both the log of hourly wage and log of total labor earnings. Since 
teacher strikes may affect labor force participation and unemployment, we also study the 
effect on the level of total labor earnings, which includes individuals with zero earnings. 
Preliminary evidence on the relationship between teacher strikes and student long-run 
outcomes is displayed in Figure 3, which plots the predicted years of schooling (Panel A) and 
labor earnings (Panel B) as a function of the number of days of teacher strikes during primary 
school.15 Across the panels, there is clear suggestive evidence of a strong linear negative 
correlation between exposure to teacher strikes and later-in-life outcomes: For each 180 days 
of teacher strikes (equivalent to a full year of primary school) labor earnings are reduced by 
6.7 percent, and years of education declines by 3.1 percent, relative to the sample means.16 
Even though the descriptive evidence in Figure 3 is instructive, it is important to note that 
causal inference cannot be made from these graphs.   
In addition to the education and labor market outcomes discussed above, we examine 
the effect of strike exposure on several socioeconomic and demographic outcomes: the 
likelihood of being the household head or spouse to the household head; the likelihood of 
being married; the number of children in the household; the age of the oldest child; the 
education level of the partner; and the per capita income of the household.  We also analyze 
intergenerational effects by examining the effect of teacher strikes on two educational 
outcomes of children to individuals who were exposed to strikes in primary school. We first 
construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if the child is not delayed at school (age of the child 
minus years of education plus 6 is greater than zero). We then construct a variable of the 
educational gap of the child, defined by years of schooling plus 6 minus age. We collapse 
these variables at the household level.  
                                                 
 
14 We also construct two alternative measures of teacher skill based on average years of education and average wage in the 
occupation. The results are robust to these alternative measures.  
15 These results are produced by a model that includes birth year, birth province and calendar year fixed effects. See the 
figure notes for detailed information. 
16 180 days is also the difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile of teacher strike exposure among the individuals 
included in our sample.  
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4.3 Local Labor Market Controls  
One of the main threats to our research design is the possibility that teacher strikes are driven 
by local labor market conditions such that the effects we identify do not represent the effect of 
exposure to teacher strikes during primary school holding all else constant, but rather the 
effect of teacher strikes and local labor market conditions during primary school.  
To minimize this threat to identification we include two variables in our estimating 
equation that serve to control for variation in local labor market conditions across provinces 
and time. First, we collect data on public administration strikes by province and year from 
CTI (the occupation with the largest number of strikes during our analysis period after 
teachers) and compute days of exposure to public administration strikes for each birth year - 
birth province cell during primary school.17 By controlling for public administration strikes, 
we exploit variation in teacher strikes net of any general province-specific events and 
conditions that fuel labor conflict. Second, we collect data on province-specific Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). This data comes from Mirabella (2002), who estimates province 
GDP using residential electricity consumption. We average the province-specific GDP during 
the seven years of primary school for each birth year -birth province cell.  
The inclusion of these controls significantly reduces the risk that our point estimates are 
driven by local labor market conditions; such local labor market conditions would have to be 
uncorrelated with province GDP and public administration strikes but correlated with teacher 
strikes and have an independent effect on the outcomes that we examine.  
 
5. Empirical Methodology 
We exploit cross-cohort variation in exposure to teacher strikes during primary school within 
and across provinces in a difference-in-difference framework. Specifically, we estimate 
models of the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑆_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛾𝑋𝑝𝑐 + ∅𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐 + 𝜑𝑝 + 𝛿𝑇𝑐 + 𝜃𝑇𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝𝑐𝑡                       (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑝𝑐𝑡 is one of the education or labor market outcomes listed above for respondents born 
in province p, in birth cohort c and observed in EPH calendar year t. Regressions are weighted 
                                                 
 
17 Public administration strikes make up more than 25 percent of all labor strikes in Argentina (Chiappe 2011; Etchemendy 
2013).  
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by the number of observations in each birth province - birth year - calendar year cell.18 The 
treatment variable of interest is 𝑇𝑆_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 and measures the number of days (in tens of 
days) that the cohort was exposed to teacher strikes during primary school.19   
Equation (1) also includes province (𝜑𝑝), birth cohort (𝜗𝑐) and calendar year (∅𝑡) fixed 
effects as well as a province-specific linear time trend (𝜃𝑇𝑝) and a cohort-specific linear time 
trend (𝛿𝑇𝑐). The province-specific linear time trend absorbs any trend in Y over time within a 
province, and the cohort-specific linear time trend absorbs any trend in outcomes over time 
within a birth cohort. Equation (1) further contains a vector of province-specific covariates 
(𝑋𝑝𝑐) that control for average socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the province 
while the cohort was in primary school.20 
In addition to using equation (1) as defined above, we also estimate versions of the 
model that substitute the linear time trends for birth province-by-calendar year and birth year-
by-calendar year fixed effects. The province-by-calendar year fixed effects control for 
variation in Y that is common across birth cohorts within a province in a given year (e.g. 
province-specific macroeconomic shocks) and the birth year-by-calendar year fixed effects 
control for any systematic difference across birth years that may be correlated with exposure 
to teacher strikes and the outcomes of interest. Though this model is more flexible than 
equation (1), it is a very demanding specification, in particular bearing in mind the relatively 
low number of observations that we use in our main analysis. Because the results produced by 
this model are not statistically significantly different from those obtained from estimation of 
equation (1), we consider equation (1) to be our preferred specification.21   
                                                 
 
18 Standard errors are clustered on the birth province – birth year level. The results are robust to clustering at the birth 
province only, but due to the small number of provinces we prefer the two-way clustering option.  
19 It is possible that teacher strikes have non-linear effects on educational attainment and labor market outcomes, such that 
the first ten days of strikes is more harmful to students than the next ten days. This could be because it takes time for parents 
to make alternative education arrangements for their children, such that the first days of a teacher strikes are more damaging. 
We have investigated this possibility by adding a quadratic term of our treatment variable in the estimation of equation (1). 
Though we do find some evidence in favor of the effect of strike exposure being larger for the first days of strikes for a few 
outcomes among males, we fail to identify a consistent pattern. Results are available upon request.  
20 In results not shown, we have also estimated this equation using number of strikes, rather than number of days of strikes, as 
our measure of treatment intensity. The results obtained from this alternative specification are consistent with the results 
presented in this paper: the number of strikes exposed to during primary school is associated with negative educational 
attainment and labor market effects. We further find substantial heterogeneity when using this alternative measure: the 
negative effects are driven exclusively by strikes that lasted for more than two days. That the effects are dependent on the 
length of the strikes is consistent with Baker (2013).  
 
21 We also perform our analysis using an instrumental variable approach in which we instrument teacher strikes with public 
administration strikes. This estimation strategy relies on a set of assumptions that are distinct from our preferred cross-cohort 
difference-in-difference method: that exposure to public administration strikes must be a good predictor of exposure to 
teacher strikes and that, conditional on the covariates and fixed effects included in the model, exposure to public 
administration strikes cannot have an independent effect on the outcomes of interest. The most serious threat to the exclusion 
restriction is that public administration strikes may have an effect on student outcomes that does not operate through 
exposure to teacher strikes (which is why we have included exposure to public administration strikes as a control variable in 
equation (1)). However, given the rich set of fixed effects as well as the control for province-specific GDP that we include in 
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The unit of observation is a birth province – birth year – calendar year, and the 
identifying variation stems from cross-cohort variation in exposure to teacher strikes during 
primary school within and across provinces. There are two main identifying assumptions 
underlying our estimation strategy. First, that there are no shocks (or other policies) 
contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially affect the different cohorts. The most 
serious threat to this identification assumption is that teacher strikes may be a reflection of 
political events, economic conditions or social situations that also vary at the birth province – 
birth year level and independently affect the outcomes of interest. This would confound our 
results and lead to invalid inference. To explore this possibility we incorporate the number of 
days (in tens of days) that the cohort was exposed to public administration strikes during 
primary school as an additional control variable in equation (1). We further control for 
average province-specific GDP during primary school to ensure that our results are not driven 
by local booms and busts that may be correlated with teacher strikes.  
Controlling for province-specific GDP and public administration strikes significantly 
reduces the risk that our point estimates are driven by local labor market conditions or secular 
shocks; such shocks would have to be uncorrelated with provincial GDP and public 
administration strikes but correlated with teacher strikes and have an independent effect on 
the outcomes that we examine (and survive the inclusion of fixed effects and linear time 
trends). Further, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other relevant policies that 
occurred concurrently with these teacher strikes that are correlated both with variation in 
teacher strikes across provinces and the outcomes that we examine. 
The second assumption underlying our estimation strategy is that the timing of teacher 
strikes must be uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each 
province. The conventional method for examining the validity of this assumption is to 
estimate event-study models that non-parametrically trace out pre-treatment relative trends as 
well as time varying treatment effects. Our research design does not lend itself well to this 
approach, and we rely on two alternative methods for illustrating that the timing of teacher 
strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each 
province.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
our model, this is unlikely. Our main results are robust to this alternative approach. The main take-away from this exercise is 
that – even if we cannot ascertain the validity of the assumptions underlying either one of our two estimation methods – the 
fact that our results are insensitive to which of these methods we use significantly limit the sources of bias that can invalidate 
our results. The reason is that the two methods rely on completely different sets of assumptions. Results from the 
instrumental variable approach are available upon request.  
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First, we incorporate province-specific linear time trends to show that our results are not 
driven by trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province. Second, we reassign 
the treatment variable for birth cohort c to birth cohort c-7, such that the measure of exposure 
to teacher strikes is the number of days (in tens of days) of primary school strikes that took 
place while the individuals were 13 – 19 years old. As these individuals have already 
completed primary school they should be unaffected by these strikes, and the coefficient on 
TS_Exposure should not be statistically or economically significant.22  
 
6. Results  
6.1 Labor Market & Education Effects of Teacher Strikes  
i. Educational attainment  
Table 5 presents baseline estimates of the effect of teacher strikes on educational attainment 
for the full sample (Panel A) as well as for males (Panel B) and females (Panel C) separately. 
Each cell in the table comes from a separate estimation of equation (1), and we add controls 
sequentially across columns. In Column 1, we control for birth province, birth year and EPH 
survey year fixed effects as well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. 
We add a cohort-specific linear time trend and a province-specific linear time trend in 
Column 2. In Column 3, we replace the linear time trends from Column 2 with birth province-
by-EPH survey year and birth year-by-EPH survey year fixed effects.  
The estimates in Table 5 provide clear evidence of a negative effect of teacher strikes on 
educational attainment. The sequential addition of controls across the columns does not have 
a statistically or economically significant effect on the point estimates. As elaborated on in 
Section 5, the model underlying the estimates in Column (2) is our preferred specification.24 
We base the majority of the discussion of our results on this model. 
The estimates in Panel A indicate that being exposed to teacher strikes for ten days 
during primary school (0.79 percent of total time in primary school) reduces the proportion of 
people in the birth year – birth province cell that obtain a high school diploma by 0.0028, 
                                                 
 
22 It should be noted that 13-19 year olds were exposed to teacher strikes as well. To the extent that teacher strikes are 
correlated across years within provinces, this model may produce economically and statistically significant results. This 
makes any null results obtained through this falsification test even more powerful in terms of supporting our identifying 
assumptions.  
24 While the model used to obtain the estimates displayed in Column (3) is more flexible, it is very demanding, in particular 
bearing in mind our relatively small sample of 4,032 birth province – birth year – EPH survey year observations. Further, the 
estimates in Column (2) are not statistically significantly different from those in Column (3). 
  
 
17 
lowers the proportion that receive a college degree by 0.0015 and reduces the number of years 
of education by 0.024. This suggests that ten days of exposure to teacher strikes during 
primary school increases the number of people that do not graduate from high school by 28 
out of every 1,000 and increases the number of people that do not finish tertiary education by 
15 out of every 1,000. These effects represent declines of 0.48 percent, 0.68 percent and 0.21 
percent relative to the respective means, which is shown directly below the estimates in the 
table. A comparison of Panel B and Panel C reveals that males are more affected by teacher 
strikes, though the effects are statistically and economically significant among individuals of 
both genders. That the effects are stronger for men is consistent with the large literature that 
shows boys to be more sensitive than girls to educational interventions and adverse shocks 
during childhood (Krueger 1999; Autor and Wasserman 2013; Bertrand and Pan 2013; Fan et 
al. 2015; Lovenheim and Willén 2016; Autor et al. 2016).  
The average individual in our sample experienced a total of 88 days of teacher strikes 
during primary school. Scaling the point estimates to account for the mean level of exposure 
(multiplying the point estimates by 8.8) suggests that the average cohort in our sample 
suffered adverse educational attainment effects with respect to the proportion of people 
obtaining a high school diploma, a college degree and years of education equivalent to 4.18, 
6.38 and 1.84 percent respectively, relative to the means.25  
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that exposure to teacher strikes not only 
has adverse short-term educational attainment effects (as measured by the reduction in the 
proportion that obtain a high school diploma), but that these effects persist as individuals 
move through the various stages of the education system (as measured by the proportion that 
obtain a college degree and the average number of years of education).26 This is an important 
finding that has not been documented before. The results show that a teacher’s decision to 
strike results in permanent harm to his or her students’ average educational outcomes.  
  
ii. Employment, labor force participation & home production 
Existing economics of education research has documented a strong positive relationship 
between educational attainment and later-in-life labor market opportunities (e.g. Ashenfelter 
                                                 
 
25 This rescaling assumes linear treatment effects. Given the suggestive evidence in Figure 3 this is not an unreasonable 
assumption. Further, when we relax this assumption in Section 6.2 our results do not change.  
26 In section 6.4 we study the effect of teacher strikes on contemporaneous educational outcomes for children aged 12-17, 
something that we cannot do for our main analysis sample due to data limitations. This auxiliary analysis reveals negative 
educational effects consistent with the results for older cohorts discussed in this section. 
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et al. 1999; Card 1999; Harmon et al. 2003; Heckman et al. 2006).27 This suggests that 
teacher strikes may also affect the students’ labor market outcomes. Table 6 examines this 
question in detail, showing estimates for the proportion of people in the birth year – birth 
province – EPH year cell who are unemployed, not in the labor force, and whose main 
activity is home production. 
Looking across the panels, there is clear evidence that exposure to teacher strikes leads 
to an increase in the proportion that is unemployed. In terms of magnitude, the point estimate 
in Panel A shows that exposure to ten days of teacher strikes leads to an increase in the 
proportion of unemployed individuals by 0.7 of a percentage point. This effect is significant 
at the 1 percent level and represents an effect of approximately 1.39 percent relative to the 
mean. Comparing Panel B and Panel C reveals that this effect is only present among males.  
Teacher strikes also increases the proportion of people whose main activity is home 
production.29 The point estimate in Table 6 shows that ten days of teacher strikes increases 
the proportion of individuals dedicated to home production by 0.18 percent, or 0.9 percent 
relative to the sample mean. Comparing Panels B and C reveals that this effect is three times 
larger for women compared to men: Ten days of teacher strikes induces 27 out of every 1,000 
females – but only 9 out of every 1,000 males - to move from either working or studying to 
home production.  
With respect to labor force participation, our results in Table 6 suggest that there is no 
statistically significant effect of teacher strikes on the extensive margin of employment. 
However, once we control for province-specific linear birth year trends in Section 6.3, we do 
find significant adverse effects of teacher strike on labor force participation among women. 
Our inability to detect this effect in our baseline table – we argue – is likely due to strong 
secular shifts in labor market opportunities that occurred for women over the cohorts we 
consider (Blau and Kahn 2013; Bick and Bruggeman 2014; Gasparini and Marchioni 2015). 
The effects that we identify in Section 6.3 suggests that exposure to 10 days of strikes reduces 
female labor force participation by 0.14 percent relative to the mean shown in Table 4.       
 
 
 
                                                 
 
27 However, it is not necessarily the case that adverse educational effects carry over to the labor market (e.g. Böhlmark and 
Willén 2017).  
29 In our sample, 6 percent are still enrolled in an educational institution and 83 percent of those are enrolled at a university.     
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iii. Earnings & wages  
The adverse employment and education effects identified in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that 
teacher strikes may have a negative effect on labor market earnings as well. This is examined 
in Table 7 with respect to log earnings, log wages and the level of earnings.30 Looking across 
the columns in Table 7, the results show statistically and economically significant adverse 
effects of strike exposure on all three income measures for the full sample (Panel A): 10 days 
of teacher strikes during primary school lead to a reduction in earnings by 0.22 percent (log-
specification), in wages by 0.25 percent, and in earnings by USD 1.85 (level-specification).31 
Scaling the point estimates to account for the average level of exposure to teacher strikes 
during our analysis period (multiplying the point estimates with 8.8) suggests that the average 
cohort in our sample suffered adverse effects of 1.94, 2.22 and 2.99 percent relative to the 
sample means, respectively.   
Another way to interpret our income estimates is to aggregate them up to the country 
level and consider the total effect on the Argentinian economy. While such back-of-the-
envelope calculations must be cautiously interpreted due to the many factors that cannot be 
taken into account when performing this exercise, it is informative for understanding the 
potential magnitude of the effect. With respect to the point estimates in Table 7, this effect is 
substantial: there are 3,645,970 individuals between the ages of 30 and 40 on the Argentinian 
labor market, and with an average loss of 88 school days due to teacher strikes, the aggregate 
earnings loss induced by teacher strikes amounts to USD 712 million. This is equivalent to 
the cost of raising the average annual employment income of all primary school teachers in 
Argentina by 19 percent.32 In terms of policy implications, this suggests that it may be worth 
raising teacher wages if this will prevent them from going on strike.  
A comparison of the gender-specific point estimates in Panels B (males) and C 
(females) shows that the log earnings and log wage effects are driven entirely by males:  10 
days of teacher strikes during primary school leads to a reduction in earnings by 0.21 percent 
and in wages by 0.32 percent, significant at the 1 percent level. The effect on earnings 
measured in levels, however, is statistically and economically significant for both genders. 
The difference between log earnings and earnings is that individuals with zero earnings are 
excluded from the log-specification. The results in Table 7 therefore suggests that teacher 
                                                 
 
30 We include the level of earnings (expressed in 2005 PPP dollars) in addition to the log of earnings as individuals with zero 
earnings automatically are eliminated from the log specification.  
31 The identified effect on the level of employment income is equivalent to 0.34 percent relative to the mean.  
32 Teachers labor earnings are approximately USD13.000 a year, and there were 289,812 primary school teachers in 2014. 
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strike exposure increases the proportion of people with zero earnings among both men and 
women, but conditional on positive earnings, it only impacts males. The female point 
estimates suggest that, conditional on being employed, wages did not fall, but the decline in 
the likelihood of receiving positive earnings shifted the wage distribution to the left. 
The point estimates in Table 7 can be used to back out the implied rate of return to 
education in Argentina. The coefficient on annual labor earnings suggests that the return to an 
additional year of primary education is 6.1 percent.33 This number is in the lower tail of pre-
existing estimates of the private rate of return to education in Argentina: 7-12.5 percent 
(Kugler and Psacharopoulos 1989; Pessino 1993; Pessino 1996; Gasparini et al. 2001; Galiani 
and Sanguinetti 2003; Patrinos et al. 2005). Four reasons help explain why the implied rate of 
return that we obtain in this paper is lower than the pre-existing estimates of the private rate 
of return to education in Argentina. First, the return to education consists of two components 
– a human capital component and a signaling component (Lange and Topel 2006). Teacher 
strikes may negatively affect human capital accumulation due to a reduction in the number of 
effective instructional days. However, teacher strikes may not affect the signaling value of 
education as much as the loss of a formal school year would, since it is unlikely that 
employers remember the level of strikes when the employee was enrolled in primary school.  
Second, our estimates represent the intent-to-treat effect of exposure to teacher strikes 
based on the province that the individuals were born in. As shown in Table 3, not all 
individuals attend primary school in their birth province. Although the fraction of individuals 
that attend school in another province is very small, some individuals’ treatment status will be 
misclassified, causing a slight attenuation bias. Third, we have treated all province-specific 
teacher strikes as affecting all schools in the province, but there is not 100 percent teacher 
compliance with respect to industrial action. This will again lead to a slight attenuation bias.  
Finally, a fraction of individuals in each birth province – birth year – calendar year cell 
has attended private primary school (approximately 18 percent), and it is unusual for private 
school teachers to participate in teacher strikes; while public teachers make up approximately 
35 percent of all strikes in Argentina, private teachers account for less than 4 percent of all 
strikes (Chiappe 2011; Etchemendy 2013). As we assign treatment status based on public 
school teacher strikes, this will again lead to a slight attenuation bias of our point estimates, 
since individuals that attended private school were not exposed to all of these strikes.  
                                                 
 
33 This number is obtained by multiplying the estimated effect of 0.34 percent by 18, as the school year consists of 180 
instructional days.  
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 The above factors explain why the implied rate of return to education that we obtain in 
this paper does not perfectly mirror the pre-existing estimates of the private rate of return to 
education in Argentina, and why we should not expect this to be the case. This discussion also 
serves to explain that our point estimates should be viewed as a lower-bound of the effect of 
teacher strikes and that the likely effect of exposure to teacher strikes is larger. 
 The results in Table 7 may conceal important heterogeneous treatment effects across 
the earnings and wage distributions. We explore this possibility in Table 8 for the full sample 
(Panel A) as well as for males (Panel B) and females (Panel C) separately. Table 8 
demonstrates that teacher strikes affect all but the lowest three deciles of the wage and 
earnings distributions, and that the magnitude of the effect is relatively constant across the 
different deciles. For males, this indicates that the people in the left tail of the wage 
distribution would have done equally poorly without teacher strikes, while the rest of the 
individuals would have done better. For females, we find that the decline in the likelihood of 
receiving positive earnings moved the wage distribution leftwards, producing a significant 
effect only for the deciles after which woman participate in the labor force. 
 
iv. Occupational quality, informal employment & hours worked 
In addition to the extensive margin employment effects that we identify above, the adverse 
effect of teacher strikes on earnings could be driven by a reduction in work hours and by 
affected individuals sorting into lower-quality occupations. This is examined in Table 9, 
where we look at the effect of teacher strikes on occupational sorting, hours worked and the 
proportion of people that work in the informal sector. To study occupational sorting, we 
follow Lovenheim and Willén (2016) and calculate the proportion of workers in one’s 
occupation with more than a high school degree to construct an index of occupation quality. 
A reduction in this index is interpreted as an occupational downgrading since it implies that 
one is working with lower-quality colleagues (as measured by their educational attainment). 
Total hours are defined only for employed workers. Finally, we define a person as holding an 
informal job if s/he is a salaried employee in a small firm (less than 5 employees), works as 
self-employed without a university degree, or is a family worker with zero earnings.  
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The results suggest that being exposed to 10 days of strikes during primary school has 
no effect on hours worked, but does have a negative effect on occupational sorting. 34 
Comparing the gender-specific point estimates in Panel B (males) and Panel C (females) 
demonstrates that this effect is driven entirely by men. With respect to the average male who 
was exposed to 88 days of teacher strikes during primary school, the occupational sorting 
effect represents an effect of 1.32 percent relative to the sample mean in Table 4. The gender-
specific results further show that teacher strikes increase the likelihood of working in the 
informal sector among females but not males. For the average female in our sample who was 
exposed to the 88 days of teacher strikes during primary school, the increase in the likelihood 
of working in the informal sector represents an effect of 4.2 percent relative to the mean.  
 
v. Effect of teacher strikes conditional on education attainment   
The effect of teacher strikes on employment and earnings can operate through two different 
human capital mechanisms. First, it can be driven by the reduction in educational attainment 
(the extensive margin of education) that we identify in Section 6.1 (Table 5). Second, it can 
be driven by a reduction in the amount of human capital accumulation that is associated with 
any given level of education (the intensive margin of education). For example, substantial 
teacher strikes in a given year may lead teachers to lower the examination requirements for a 
certain cohort in order to account for lost instructional time, so that the extensive margin of 
education is unaffected while there are adverse effects on the intensive margin.35   
To obtain suggestive evidence of the relative importance of these two mechanisms, we 
run individual-level regressions of the main outcomes conditional on educational attainment. 
The intuition behind this approach is that such regressions eliminate the extensive margin 
effect of teacher strikes, and the effect that remains is therefore driven, at least in part, by the 
intensive margin. Table 10 presents results of the effect of teacher strikes holding educational 
attainment constant. We find that approximately 50 percent of the effect on occupational 
sorting and earnings among men is explained by the extensive margin, while the other 50 
percent is due to intensive margin effects. However, most of the effects on unemployment and 
home production are explained by the intensive margin. Although the relative importance of 
the intensive and extensive margin effects appears to differ across the outcomes that we look 
                                                 
 
34 The results are robust to alternative measures of occupational quality, such as average wage or years of education in one’s 
occupation. 
35 The results in this section should be interpreted with caution and considered only as suggestive since there is likely 
selection on unobservables into each of the educational levels as response to teacher strike exposure.  
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at, the main take-away is that the effect of strike exposure on later-in-life labor market 
outcomes operates through both intensive and extensive margin education effects.  
 
vi. Socioeconomic & intergenerational effects of teacher strikes 
There exists a large literature documenting a strong positive relationship between an 
individual’s education- and labor market outcomes and his socioeconomic position (e.g. Finer 
and Zolna 2014). Given the adverse education and labor market effects that we identify 
above, teacher strikes may also impact outcomes such as the likelihood of being married, the 
probability of being the head of the household (or the spouse to the head of the household), 
the number of children (conditional on being head or spouse), the age of the oldest child, the 
educational attainment of the partner, and the household per capita income. 36  Table 11 
explores these questions in detail, showing the results from estimation of equation (1) for each 
of the outcomes mentioned above.  
Across the columns in Table 11, there is clear evidence of a negative effect of teacher 
strikes on the probability of being the household head (or the spouse to the head of the 
household), and of a positive effect of having children, among females. Relative to the sample 
means displayed in Table 4, exposure to ten days of teacher strikes leads to a 0.19 percent 
reduction in the likelihood of being household head and a 0.32 percent increase in the 
probability having children. That we find effects among females but not among males could 
be due to the heterogeneous treatment effects identified in Section 6.1: while teacher strike 
exposure causes males to sort into lower skill occupations, it leads females to move toward 
home production, potentially lowering their bargaining position in the household (thus 
leading to a reduction in the probability of being household head) and increasing the time that 
they can allocate towards non-work tasks (such as raising children).37  
The results in Table 11 further show that teacher strike exposure affects the marriage 
market by influencing the characteristics of exposed individuals’ partners. Specifically, the 
results show that the partners of females that were exposed to more days of teacher strikes are 
less educated: an additional 10 days of strikes leads to a decline in the years of education of 
                                                 
 
36 Given the structure of the EPH, we can only identify children of the head, or the spouse of the head, of the household. 
37 It is important to note that the positive effect on the probability of having children does not imply that exposure to teacher 
strikes induces an increase in total fertility; it could be that affected individuals have the same number of children but that 
they have them sooner. In an attempt to disentangle this effect, we examine the effect of strike exposure on the age of the 
oldest child in the household. We find a statistically significant effect of strike exposure on the age of the oldest child in the 
household, supporting the claim that more exposed cohorts have their first child sooner than less exposed cohorts. 
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females’ partners by 0.037, or 4.7 percent relative to the sample mean when scaled to the 
average strike exposure of 88 days. We do not find a significant effect among males. 
Finally, the point estimates in Table 11 also show that strikes affect per capita family 
income: the average individual in our sample is exposed to 88 days of teacher strikes, and this 
is associated with a decline in household per capita income by around 4 percent relative to the 
sample mean. The effect is not statistically significantly different across genders. For females, 
this effect seems to be driven by an increase in family household size and by a decline in the 
earnings of their partners (that are on average less educated). For males, the decline in per 
capita income is driven by the negative effects of strikes on their individual earnings. 
    Given that teacher strikes not only has adverse effects on long-run educational 
attainment and labor market outcomes, but also influences the family planning decisions of 
females, it follows that there may be important intergenerational treatment effects associated 
with strikes. Even though data limitations prevent us from exploring such effects in great 
detail, we can look at two educational outcomes of children to individuals that were exposed 
to teacher strikes during primary school. First, the probability of not being delayed at school. 
This variable takes a value of one if the age of the child minus years of education is greater 
than 6 (age at which children are expected to start primary education), and zero otherwise. 
Second, the educational gap defined by years of schooling plus 6 minus age.  
The point estimates obtained from estimating our main specification with the 
probability of not being delayed at school and the educational gap as the dependent variables, 
are displayed in Table 12. Across the table, there is evidence of adverse intergenerational 
education effects among females but not among males. This is consistent with the 
heterogeneous treatment effects identified in Section 6.1. In terms of magnitude, being 
exposed to ten days of teacher strikes during primary school leads to a 0.43 percent increase 
in the probability that the child is delayed at school relative to the mean (and to an increase in 
the education gap of 1.45 percent relative to the mean).   
Taken together, the above discussion demonstrates that exposure to teacher strikes not 
only impacts long-term educational attainment and labor market outcomes, but also family 
planning decisions and the educational outcomes of the affected individuals’ children. These 
results have never been documented before. Due to the scarce literature on this topic, 
additional research that examines these questions should be encouraged.  
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6.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
A large literature has documented that human capital accumulates over time, such that human 
capital obtained at one point in time facilitates further skill attainment later in life (e.g. 
Heckman et al. 2006). Therefore, early childhood investments are often argued to yield higher 
returns than education investments that target older children.38 With respect to the current 
analysis, this suggests that exposure to teacher strikes in early grades may have larger adverse 
effects on long-run educational and labor market outcomes.  
Table 13 shows the effect of exposure to teacher strikes on the long-term education and 
labor market outcomes of students based on whether they were exposed to strikes in grades 1 
through 4 or in grades 5 through 7. Across the columns in Table 13, there is suggestive 
evidence that teacher strikes in early grades have noticeably larger adverse effects than strikes 
in later grades. However, these differences are generally not statistically significant. For 
example, exposure to ten days of strikes while in grades 1 through 4 leads to a reduction in 
wage by 0.37 percent. Exposure to teacher strikes while in grades 5 through 7 causes a decline 
in wage by only 0.17 percent. However, we are unable to reject the null that the difference 
between the two estimates is zero. Only for two outcomes do we find that the effect of teacher 
strikes in early school grades is statistically significantly different from the effect of teacher 
strikes in later school grades: years of education and total earnings for females.      
 
6.3 Robustness & Sensitivity Analysis  
The results obtained from our preferred specification support the idea that teacher strikes have 
adverse effects on long-term educational attainment and labor market outcomes. In this 
section, we explore evidence on whether these results are driven by other policies, trends or 
events that are not accounted for by the controls in equation (1).  
In Panel A and Panel B of Table 14 we exclude the city of Buenos Aires and the 
province and city of Buenos Aires, respectively. These geographic areas differ slightly from 
the rest of Argentina with respect to their institutions and legislation, and account for half the 
population of the country. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that our results are not 
driven exclusively by these geographic areas. Comparing the results in Panel A and Panel B 
with our baseline results in Section 6.1, it is clear that there are no statistically or 
                                                 
 
38 This argument is also based on research that finds young children to be more receptive to learning. See for example 
Shonkoff and Phillips (2000).  
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economically significant differences between the point estimates obtained from estimating 
equation (1) when these regions are included and the point estimates obtained from estimating 
equation (1) when these regions have been omitted.39  
In Panel C of Table 14 we re-estimate our preferred model specification without the five 
provinces that have the highest cross-province mobility rates (Chaco, Corrientes, Misiones, 
Rio Negro and Santa Cruz). The point estimates produced for this subsample of provinces are 
not statistically significantly different from our baseline results. This demonstrates that our 
results are robust to accounting for cross-province mobility. 
Panel D of Table 14 eliminates pre-2010 EPH survey years to ensure that our results are 
robust to a balanced panel of age observations. Despite a dramatic loss of observations (recall 
that our baseline analysis relies on the 2003-2015 EPH waves), the point estimates are not 
statistically significantly different when imposing this restriction. This illustrates that our 
results are robust to having a balanced panel with respect to age observations.   
Panel E of Table 14 displays results from estimation of equation (1) when we have 
reassigned the treatment variable for birth cohort c to birth cohort c-7. These cohorts are very 
close in age and are likely exposed to similar province-specific macroeconomic environments. 
However, the c-7 cohorts have already completed primary school when the documented 
teacher strikes took place, and if our baseline estimates successfully isolate the effect of 
teacher strikes on student outcomes, we should not find any statistically and economically 
significant effects among these cohorts. Looking across the columns, none of the point 
estimates are statistically significant. These results are therefore consistent with the 
identification assumption that the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in 
outcomes across birth cohorts within each province. 
Panel F shows results for our preferred specification when province-specific linear birth 
year trends have been included. These results help us to further examine if our empirical 
research design has successfully managed to isolate the effect of teacher strikes on student 
outcomes, or if the coefficient estimates simply are driven by trends in outcomes across birth 
cohorts within each province. The results from this exercise are not statistically significantly 
different from our baseline estimates. This demonstrates that our baseline results are not 
driven by trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province.  
                                                 
 
39 Even though the effect of exposure to teacher strikes on total earnings among males is smaller in Panel B compared to our 
baseline estimate, this difference is not statistically significant. 
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Panel G displays results from estimation of equation (1) when we drop the birth cohort 
– birth province – calendar year cells that were in the top percent of the teacher strike 
exposure distribution. Looking across the columns, Panel G shows that the exclusion of 
outliers does not change our results. There is one exception - the coefficient on total earnings 
for males is no longer significant. However, this point estimate is imprecisely estimated in our 
baseline table and was only significant at 10 percent. The coefficient estimates on hourly 
wages, years of education and occupational sorting are not statistically significantly different 
when we omit outliers, and they are still significant at the 1 percent level. These results 
demonstrate that our results are not being driven by outliers. 
One of the main threats to valid inference in our paper, despite the inclusion of fixed 
effects and demographic controls, is that our results are simply picking up differences in 
outcomes caused by province-specific variation in macroeconomic performance across time. 
To explore this question, we use post-2003 EPH data (data on local labor markets do not exist 
before 2003) to explore the relationship between teacher strikes and local labor market 
conditions. Provided that the relationship between teacher strikes and local labor markets after 
2003 is informative of that same relationship during the period 1977-1998, this auxiliary 
analysis can be used to examine if our results are simply picking up differences in outcomes 
caused by province-specific variation in macroeconomic performance over time. 
The result from this exercise is shown in Table 15. In Column (1) we show the 
correlation between teacher strikes and the unemployment rate, the average hourly wages and 
the average per capita family income. In Column (2) we add days of strikes in public 
administration as well as calendar year and province fixed effects.40 Our main finding is that, 
once we control for public administration strikes, province-specific GDP and province and 
year fixed effects, there is no significant relation between the local labor market climate and 
teacher strikes. In Table 16 we further show that the inclusion of public administration strikes 
and province-specific GDP controls have no impact on our main results. Taken together, these 
results suggest that our identified results are not simply driven by province-specific variation 
in macroeconomic performance across time. 
  
 
                                                 
 
40 The results are robust to the inclusion of the 30th and the 70th percentiles of the per capita family income (intended to 
capture any effect of a change in the distribution of per capita family income). Results are available upon request.  
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6.4 Short-run effects  
In this section we analyze the effect of exposure to teacher strikes on outcomes of students 
who have just finished primary school.41  The purpose of this exercise is to examine if the 
adverse effects of strike exposure that we have identified above are present immediately after 
the children have been exposed to strikes, or if the effects develop over time. We use the 
2003-2015 EPH waves for children between 12 and 17 years old to perform this analysis.42 
We concentrate on educational outcomes since most of these individuals have not yet entered 
the labor market. These outcomes are: the likelihood of having attended primary school, the 
probability of attending a public institution, years of education, the likelihood that the main 
activity is home production, and the likelihood of being enrolled in school. We perform this 
analysis on the individual level to control for household characteristics.43 
Table 17 displays the results for each one of the outcome variables using two different 
specifications. Column (1) incorporates the same controls as in our preferred specification.44 
Column (2) incorporates additional local labor market controls (the unemployment rate and 
the average wage in each province-year) and family characteristics (4 dummies for province-
specific quartiles of per capita family income and 5 dummies for the maximum educational 
level of the head, or spouse to the head, of the household: primary education or less, 
incomplete secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary).  
With respect to females, the results in Table 17 shows that there is a decline in public 
education enrollment of 0.59 of a percentage point, or 0.74 percent relative to the sample 
mean. This effect increases to 4.2 percent relative to the mean when we scale the coefficient 
to account for the average level of strike exposure among these individuals (57 days). For 
males, the effect of exposure to 10 days of strikes during primary education reduces the years 
of education by 0.029 (0.37 percent relative to the mean), increases the likelihood of home 
production by 0.0021 (3.45 percent relative to the mean) and decreases the probability of 
being enrolled by 0.0040 (5.03 percent relative to the mean). These results indicate that the 
negative effects of teacher strikes during primary school on educational attainment are already 
visible at the secondary level, in particular for men.   
                                                 
 
41 Due to educational reforms during the past two decades, grade 7 became a part of secondary education in 2002, and 
mandatory education was extended from 7 to 12 years in 1998. In this section the treatment variable is still defined as the 
days of strike while students were in primary school, which is now when the children were between 6 and 11 years old.  
42 We exclude cohorts from 1986 to 1990 since the educational reform was taking place at a different rate in each province 
Gasparini et al. (2015).  
43 These results are robust to estimation at the aggregate level used in our main analysis. These results are available upon 
request.  
44 Except for GDP at the province level for which there is not reliable data available in recent years.  
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In Section 2.3 we note that there may be heterogeneous treatment effects of teacher 
strike exposure with respect to the socioeconomic characteristics of the student’s parents: 
wealthy parents can afford to move their children to private institutions if they believe the 
strikes hurt their children, and more educated parents are more likely to be capable to replace 
lost instructional days with home schooling. Even though we do not have information on 
parental wealth and educational attainment for the individuals included in our main analysis, 
we can examine this for children that are between 12-17 years old. In Table 18, we estimate 
the effect of teacher strike exposure by per capita family income and maximum years of 
education of the head, or the spouse to the head, of the household. The equation that has been 
used to obtain the results shown in Panel A includes dummies of maximum education of 
head, or spouse to the head, of the household, as well as interactions between the treatment 
variable and these dummies. The model underlying the results presented in Panel B includes 
indicator variables for province-specific quartiles of per capita family income as well as 
interactions between the treatment variable and these dummies. Consistent with our 
predictions, we find clear evidence that the most affected students are those from the most 
socioeconomically disadvantaged households.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion  
Teacher industrial action is a prevalent feature of public education systems across the globe. 
Despite a large theoretical literature on labor strikes and a reignited debate over the role of 
teachers’ unions in education, there is a lack of empirical research that credibly evaluates the 
effect of teacher strikes on student outcomes. This paper contributes to the literature by 
providing a detailed analysis of the effect of exposure to teacher strikes during primary school 
on long-run educational attainment and labor market outcomes.  
Our analysis reveals that there are adverse effects of exposure to teacher strikes on long-
run educational attainment and labor market outcomes for both males and females. For males, 
we find that exposure to teacher strikes during primary school leads to a reduction in 
educational attainment, an increase in the likelihood of being unemployed, occupational 
downgrading, and has adverse effects on both labor market earnings and hourly wages. For 
females, teacher strikes reduce educational attainment in a way similar to that of men. We 
find a reduction in the level of earnings among females as well, but teacher strikes do not 
affect the wages of females who are employed. We show that this is because teacher strikes 
induce females to sort into home production. Our analysis reveals that teacher strikes affect 
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women on several additional socioeconomic dimensions as well. Specifically, females 
exposed to teacher strikes during primary school have more children, less educated partners, 
and lower per capita family income. We argue that some of these effects are driven by a 
decline in female’s bargain power within the household. By looking at 12-17 years old, we 
demonstrate that the negative educational effects of teacher strikes are already visible at the 
secondary level, and that these effects are concentrated among children from the most 
vulnerable households.  
 The prevalence of teacher strikes in Argentina means the effect of teacher strikes on the 
economy as a whole is substantial: A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests an aggregate 
annual earnings loss of $712 million. This is equivalent to the cost of raising the average 
employment income of all primary school teachers in Argentina by 19 percent. In terms of 
policy implications, this suggests that it may be worth raising teacher wages if this will 
prevent them from going on strike. 
Taken together, our results stress the importance of stable labor relations between 
government and industry and emphasize the necessity of creating a stable bargaining 
environment that reduces the number of days of teacher strikes that students are exposed to. 
Given that the negative effects that we identify last for years and even generations, both 
unions and government should make substantial attempts to limit the prevalence of teacher 
strikes. One policy could be to introduce labor contracts that extend over several years, and 
only allow teachers to strike if a bargaining impasse is reached when renewing these multi-
year contracts. This would eliminate sporadic teacher strikes while still allowing teachers to 
use industrial action as a tool to ensure fair contracts.  
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Figure 1: Variation in Teacher Strikes 1977-2014
Panel A: Days of teacher strikes
Panel B: Number of teacher strikes
Notes: Authors' tabulations from annual reports on the Argentine economy published by Consejo Técnico de Inversiones (1977-
2014). Panel A shows the evolution of days teacher strikes for each province and at a national level. Panel B displays the number
of teacher strikes. The vertical line indicates the two sub-samples used for the estimation of long-run (left) and short-run (right)
outcomes.
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Figure 2: Data structure for a subsample of birth cohorts
Notes: Example of three cohorts that are part of our main analysis.
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Figure 3: Suggestive evidence: correlation between teacher strikes and student Outcomes
A. Years of Education B. Earnings
Notes: The ﬁgure is a binned scatter plot. The horizontal axis shows the days of teacher strikes during primary education,
which varies at birth year- birth province level. The vertical axis of Panel A contains the average years of education and Panel
B the average labor income for each birth year- birth province-survey year cell, after controlling for province, cohort and survey
year ﬁxed eﬀects. Data is grouped on 20 intervals of equal number of observations according to days of exposure to teacher
strikes. Each point correspond to the group average of the variable in the vertical axes. 180 days of teacher strikes is equivalent
to a full year of primary school and the diﬀerence between the 10th and the 90th percentile of teacher strike exposure among
the individuals included in our sample.
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Table 3: Cross-province mobility of
13 year olds
Province Fraction Non-movers
Buenos Aires 0.979
Catamarca 0.963
Chaco 0.855
Chubut 0.930
Ciudad Bs.As. 0.999
Cordoba 0.947
Corrientes 0.850
Entre Rios 0.905
Formosa 0.942
Jujuy 0.932
La Pampa 0.952
La Rioja 0.968
Mendoza 0.947
Misiones 0.836
Neuquen 0.979
Rio Negro 0.715
Salta 0.943
San Juan 0.949
San Luis 0.945
Santa Cruz 0.835
Santa Fe 0.975
Sgo del Estero 0.942
T. del Fuego 0.943
Tucuman 0.952
Notes: Authors' tabulations from 2003-2015
EPH data on 13 year old respondents. The table
shows the fraction of 13 year olds during 2003-
2015 that live in the same province they were
born. Bold numbers represents provinces with
fraction of non-movers higher than 0.9.
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Table 4: Dependant variable means
All Male Female
Panel A: Educational Attainment
Secondary Education Completed 0.589 0.559 0.620
Years of Education 11.455 11.178 11.731
Tertiery Education Completed 0.207 0.166 0.248
Panel B: Employment
Unemployment 0.054 0.042 0.066
Not in Labor Force 0.177 0.041 0.312
Home Production 0.199 0.069 0.329
Informal Sector 0.332 0.309 0.354
Hours Worked 31.746 42.265 21.239
Occupational Sorting 0.230 0.177 0.284
Panel C: Wage and Earnings
Log Total Earnings 6.306 6.489 6.123
Total Earnings 550.4 731.8 372.3
Log Wage 1.256 1.255 1.257
Panel D: Other Socioeconomic Outcomes
Head of Household or Spouse 0.772 0.743 0.801
Married 0.702 0.716 0.688
Number of Children 1.512 1.353 1.671
Log Per Capita Family Income 6.720 6.791 6.650
Years of Schooling of Partner 11.044 11.732 10.357
Age of older kid 11.824 11.331 12.315
Panel D: Intergenerational Outcomes
Not Delayed at School 0.721 0.728 0.714
Gap in Years of Education -0.482 -0.462 -0.503
Notes: Authors' tabulations from 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-40 years old
respondents from 1971-1985 cohorts. Home production is deﬁned as neither
working nor studying. Informality is deﬁned as the share of employed workers
that are salaried employee in a small ﬁrm (less than 5 employees), or works
as self-employed without a university degree, or is a family worker with
zero earnings. Occupational sorting is evaluated by constructing an index
of occupation quality based on the proportion of workers in each occupation
with more than a high school degree. Not being delayed at school is deﬁned
as a dummy variable takes the value of one if the age of the child minus
years of education plus 6 is greater than zero, and it takes the value of zero
otherwise. The educational gap deﬁned by years of schooling plus 6 minus
age.
40
T
a
b
le
5
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
A
tt
a
in
m
en
t
H
ig
h
S
ch
o
o
l
D
ip
lo
m
a
C
o
ll
eg
e
D
eg
re
e
Y
ea
rs
o
f
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.5
1
%
-0
.4
8
%
-0
.4
9
%
-0
.6
8
%
-0
.7
3
%
-0
.8
2
%
-0
.2
0
%
-0
.2
1
%
-0
.2
2
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.5
7
%
-0
.5
4
%
-0
.5
2
%
-1
.2
7
%
-1
.4
5
%
-1
.3
9
%
-0
.2
3
%
-0
.2
3
%
-0
.2
3
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
7
-0
.0
0
0
8
-0
.0
0
1
0
-0
.0
2
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.4
4
%
-0
.4
2
%
-0
.4
7
%
-0
.2
8
%
-0
.3
2
%
-0
.4
0
%
-0
.1
8
%
-0
.1
8
%
-0
.2
0
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-
E
P
H
y
ea
r
ce
ll
.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
41
T
a
b
le
6
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
N
o
t
in
L
a
b
o
r
F
o
rc
e
H
o
m
e
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.9
3
%
1
.4
9
%
1
.3
0
%
0
.1
7
%
0
.1
1
%
0
.1
7
%
0
.7
5
%
0
.9
0
%
0
.9
0
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
0
7
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
0
0
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
1
.1
9
%
1
.9
1
%
1
.6
7
%
-0
.7
3
%
-0
.9
7
%
-0
.7
3
%
0
.8
7
%
1
.3
0
%
1
.3
0
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.6
1
%
1
.3
7
%
1
.2
2
%
0
.2
6
%
0
.2
2
%
0
.2
9
%
0
.6
7
%
0
.8
2
%
0
.8
5
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
H
o
m
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
a
s
n
ei
th
er
w
o
rk
in
g
n
o
r
st
u
d
y
in
g
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-E
P
H
y
ea
r
ce
ll
.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
42
T
a
b
le
7
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
W
a
g
es
a
n
d
E
a
rn
in
g
s
L
o
g
E
a
rn
in
g
s
L
o
g
W
a
g
es
T
o
ta
l
E
a
rn
in
g
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
2
0
*
-0
.0
0
2
2
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
4
*
*
*
-1
.5
9
2
5
*
*
-1
.8
4
9
4
*
*
*
-1
.7
5
8
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.6
3
7
0
)
(0
.6
3
4
7
)
(0
.5
9
7
8
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0
.2
9
%
-0
.3
4
%
-0
.3
2
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
1
7
-0
.0
0
2
1
*
-0
.0
0
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
6
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
2
*
*
*
-1
.6
0
8
9
-1
.7
0
3
9
*
-1
.6
5
3
3
*
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(1
.0
7
7
9
)
(0
.9
8
8
4
)
(0
.9
6
7
1
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0
.2
2
%
-0
.2
3
%
-0
.2
3
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
2
3
-0
.0
0
2
2
-0
.0
0
1
9
-0
.0
0
1
1
-0
.0
0
1
9
-0
.0
0
1
7
-1
.5
6
2
7
*
-1
.9
0
6
4
*
*
-1
.7
7
1
6
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.8
4
9
4
)
(0
.8
6
8
4
)
(0
.8
4
4
0
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0
.4
2
%
-0
.5
1
%
-0
.4
8
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
T
h
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
a
re
:
lo
g
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
la
b
o
r
ea
rn
in
g
s,
lo
g
o
f
w
a
g
es
,
a
n
d
th
e
le
v
el
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
la
b
o
r
ea
rn
in
g
s
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
ze
ro
s)
.
T
h
e
%
eﬀ
ec
t
is
d
ro
o
p
ed
fo
r
lo
g
va
ri
a
b
le
s
g
iv
en
th
a
t
th
e
p
o
in
t
es
ti
m
a
te
is
a
lr
ea
d
y
in
te
rp
re
te
d
a
s
a
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-E
P
H
y
ea
r
ce
ll
.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
43
T
a
b
le
8
:
H
et
er
o
g
en
eo
u
s
T
re
a
tm
en
t
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
.
E
a
rn
in
g
s
a
n
d
W
a
g
es
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
(T
o
ta
l
E
a
rn
in
gs
)
1
0
th
2
0
th
3
0
th
4
0
th
5
0
th
6
0
th
7
0
th
8
0
th
9
0
th
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.1
8
9
0
0
.0
3
2
4
-0
.6
8
4
7
-1
.5
8
9
7
*
*
-1
.9
3
9
8
*
*
-2
.2
5
1
1
*
*
-3
.5
0
0
8
*
*
*
-2
.8
3
9
8
*
*
*
-3
.7
7
7
7
*
(0
.5
9
6
8
)
(0
.4
4
4
0
)
(0
.5
2
9
1
)
(0
.6
7
8
5
)
(0
.7
9
6
1
)
(0
.9
0
4
8
)
(1
.0
0
5
3
)
(1
.0
7
3
8
)
(1
.9
6
8
0
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.2
0
%
0
.0
2
%
-0
.2
7
%
-0
.4
6
%
-0
.4
3
%
-0
.4
0
%
-0
.5
0
%
-0
.3
3
%
-0
.3
3
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.4
3
4
4
-0
.2
0
3
3
-1
.3
6
8
3
-1
.1
0
6
2
-1
.3
5
2
3
-2
.1
2
8
1
*
*
-3
.1
1
9
7
*
*
-2
.3
9
2
8
-5
.1
7
2
9
*
(1
.2
6
6
0
)
(0
.8
9
8
5
)
(0
.8
6
5
2
)
(0
.9
1
9
3
)
(0
.9
0
0
1
)
(1
.0
4
4
1
)
(1
.3
2
6
7
)
(1
.6
4
0
5
)
(2
.6
4
9
0
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.2
5
%
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.3
1
%
-0
.2
0
%
-0
.2
1
%
-0
.2
8
%
-0
.3
5
%
-0
.2
2
%
-0
.3
8
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
9
3
8
0
.2
9
3
1
-0
.0
7
2
4
-2
.0
4
0
9
*
-2
.4
5
6
1
*
-2
.3
2
8
3
-3
.7
6
9
8
*
*
-3
.1
2
5
5
*
*
-2
.3
5
2
5
(0
.1
0
2
8
)
(0
.2
9
4
0
)
(0
.6
5
7
2
)
(1
.1
2
4
4
)
(1
.4
3
6
0
)
(1
.5
4
0
8
)
(1
.4
8
6
2
)
(1
.4
4
0
4
)
(2
.9
0
5
0
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.8
3
%
0
.9
8
%
-0
.1
0
%
-1
.3
9
%
-0
.9
8
%
-0
.6
3
%
-0
.7
5
%
-0
.4
7
%
-0
.2
6
%
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
(l
og
w
a
ge
s)
1
0
th
2
0
th
3
0
th
4
0
th
5
0
th
6
0
th
7
0
th
8
0
th
9
0
th
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
1
3
-0
.0
0
0
9
-0
.0
0
2
2
*
-0
.0
0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
1
9
-0
.0
0
2
5
-0
.0
0
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
7
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
0
6
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
1
-0
.0
0
2
5
-0
.0
0
3
5
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
6
-0
.0
0
3
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
2
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
fo
r
d
iﬀ
er
en
t
d
ec
il
es
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
la
b
o
r
ea
rn
in
g
a
n
d
lo
g
w
a
g
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-
E
P
H
y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
A
ll
o
u
tc
o
m
es
a
re
ex
p
re
ss
ed
in
2
0
0
5
P
P
P
d
o
ll
a
rs
.
T
h
e
%
eﬀ
ec
t
is
d
ro
o
p
ed
fo
r
lo
g
w
a
g
e
g
iv
en
th
a
t
th
e
p
o
in
t
es
ti
m
a
te
is
a
lr
ea
d
y
in
te
rp
re
te
d
a
s
a
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
44
T
a
b
le
9
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
Q
u
a
li
ty
a
n
d
W
o
rk
H
o
u
rs
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
o
rt
in
g
T
o
ta
l
H
o
u
rs
In
fo
rm
a
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
9
-0
.0
1
9
8
-0
.0
1
6
4
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
0
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
2
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
4
)
(0
.0
2
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.3
5
%
-0
.3
5
%
-0
.3
9
%
-0
.0
8
%
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.0
5
%
0
.2
4
%
0
.2
1
%
0
.3
0
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
9
-0
.0
1
1
1
-0
.0
0
9
9
-0
.0
0
0
1
-0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
3
4
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
8
)
(0
.0
3
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.9
1
%
-0
.8
5
%
-0
.7
9
%
-0
.0
3
%
-0
.0
3
%
-0
.0
2
%
-0
.0
3
%
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.0
3
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
3
6
6
-0
.0
2
6
2
-0
.0
1
9
4
0
.0
0
1
6
*
0
.0
0
1
7
*
0
.0
0
1
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
5
4
)
(0
.0
3
7
5
)
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.0
7
%
-0
.1
1
%
-0
.1
4
%
-0
.1
7
%
-0
.1
2
%
-0
.0
9
%
0
.4
5
%
0
.4
8
%
0
.5
4
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
so
rt
in
g
is
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
b
y
co
n
st
ru
ct
in
g
a
n
in
d
ex
o
f
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
q
u
a
li
ty
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
in
ea
ch
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
a
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
d
eg
re
e.
T
o
ta
l
h
o
u
rs
a
re
o
n
ly
d
eﬁ
n
ed
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
ed
w
o
rk
er
s.
In
fo
rm
a
li
ty
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
a
s
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
em
p
lo
y
ed
w
o
rk
er
s
th
a
t
a
re
sa
la
ri
ed
em
p
lo
y
ee
in
a
sm
a
ll
ﬁ
rm
(l
es
s
th
a
n
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s)
,
o
r
w
o
rk
s
a
s
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
w
it
h
o
u
t
a
u
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
eg
re
e,
o
r
is
a
fa
m
il
y
w
o
rk
er
w
it
h
ze
ro
ea
rn
in
g
s.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-E
P
H
y
ea
r
ce
ll
.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
45
T
a
b
le
1
0
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
H
o
ld
in
g
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
A
tt
a
in
m
en
t
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
o
g
T
o
ta
l
H
o
m
e
S
o
rt
in
g
W
a
g
e
E
a
rn
in
g
s
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
1
4
*
-0
.8
4
8
1
0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.5
5
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.1
7
%
-
-0
.1
5
%
1
.4
9
%
0
.8
5
%
%
O
f
to
ta
l
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
st
ri
ke
s
5
0
.0
%
5
8
.3
3
%
4
8
.2
%
1
1
4
.3
%
9
4
.4
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
9
*
-0
.8
2
2
0
0
.0
0
0
8
*
*
0
.0
0
0
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.9
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.4
5
%
-
-0
.1
1
%
1
.9
1
%
1
.3
0
%
%
O
f
to
ta
l
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
st
ri
ke
s
5
0
.0
%
5
9
.3
8
%
4
9
.7
%
1
1
4
.3
%
1
0
0
.0
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
7
-0
.8
9
4
9
0
.0
0
1
0
*
0
.0
0
2
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.6
3
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.0
7
%
-
-0
.2
4
%
1
.5
3
%
0
.7
6
%
%
O
f
to
ta
l
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
st
ri
ke
s
-1
0
0
.0
%
4
1
.1
8
%
5
0
.5
%
1
2
5
.0
%
8
9
.3
%
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
d
ep
ic
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l-
le
v
el
d
a
ta
in
o
rd
er
to
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t.
A
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
y
ea
rs
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
a
s
co
n
tr
o
l.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
h
o
ld
in
g
co
n
st
a
n
t
th
e
le
v
el
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
46
T
a
b
le
1
1
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
O
th
er
S
o
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
O
u
tc
o
m
es
H
ea
d
o
f
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
M
a
rr
ie
d
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
K
id
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
6
-0
.0
0
1
2
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
8
*
*
0
.0
0
3
5
*
*
0
.0
0
3
6
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.0
8
%
-0
.1
6
%
-0
.1
9
%
0
.0
3
%
-0
.0
7
%
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.2
9
%
-0
.3
4
%
-0
.3
2
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
6
-0
.0
0
1
5
*
-0
.0
0
1
9
*
*
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
5
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
0
0
.0
0
2
7
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.0
8
%
-0
.2
0
%
-0
.2
6
%
0
.0
3
%
-0
.0
7
%
-0
.0
8
%
-0
.2
2
%
-0
.2
3
%
-0
.2
3
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
0
-0
.0
0
1
1
*
0
.0
0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
4
0
.0
0
4
1
0
.0
0
4
4
*
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.1
2
%
-0
.1
4
%
0
.0
4
%
-0
.0
6
%
-0
.0
3
%
-0
.4
2
%
-0
.5
1
%
-0
.4
8
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
H
ea
d
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
a
s
h
ea
d
o
r
sp
o
u
se
o
f
th
e
h
ea
d
.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ch
il
d
re
n
is
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
b
ei
n
g
h
ea
d
o
r
sp
o
u
se
.
T
h
e
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
o
ld
es
t
ch
il
d
is
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
h
av
in
g
ch
il
d
re
n
a
n
d
o
n
ly
d
eﬁ
n
ed
fo
r
h
ea
d
o
r
sp
o
u
se
o
f
th
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
.
T
h
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t
o
f
th
e
p
a
rt
n
er
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
fo
r
h
ea
d
s
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
o
r
sp
o
u
se
s
to
h
ea
d
s
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s.
it
h
sp
o
u
se
o
f
fo
r
sp
o
u
se
s)
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-E
P
H
y
ea
r
ce
ll
.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
47
T
a
b
le
1
1
:
E
ﬀ
ec
t
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
o
n
O
th
er
S
o
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
O
u
tc
o
m
es
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e)
A
g
e
o
f
o
ld
er
k
id
P
er
C
a
p
it
a
F
a
m
il
y
In
co
m
e
Y
ea
rs
o
f
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
o
f
P
a
rt
n
er
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
1
1
7
*
0
.0
1
4
1
*
*
0
.0
1
3
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.1
0
%
0
.1
2
%
0
.1
2
%
-0
.2
4
%
-0
.3
8
%
-0
.4
1
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
9
9
0
.0
0
8
3
0
.0
0
8
9
-0
.0
0
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
6
-0
.0
0
6
8
-0
.0
0
6
7
(0
.0
0
8
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.0
8
%
0
.0
7
%
0
.0
8
%
-0
.1
0
%
-0
.1
0
%
-0
.1
0
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
1
2
9
0
.0
1
9
5
*
*
0
.0
1
8
5
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.1
1
%
0
.1
6
%
0
.1
6
%
-0
.5
0
%
-0
.5
3
%
-0
.5
4
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
X
X
X
X
48
T
a
b
le
1
2
:
In
te
rg
en
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l
T
re
a
tm
en
t
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
N
o
t
D
el
ay
ed
a
t
S
ch
o
o
l
G
a
p
in
Y
ea
rs
o
f
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
1
4
-0
.0
0
1
1
-0
.0
0
0
9
-0
.0
0
4
5
-0
.0
0
2
8
-0
.0
0
2
2
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.1
9
%
-0
.1
5
%
-0
.1
2
%
0
.9
3
%
0
.5
8
%
0
.4
6
%
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
2
-0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.0
0
2
5
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0
.0
8
%
0
.1
6
%
0
.1
6
%
0
.2
6
%
-0
.4
8
%
-0
.5
4
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
-0
.0
0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
%
E
ﬀ
ec
t
-0
.4
3
%
-0
.4
3
%
-0
.4
1
%
1
.4
7
%
1
.4
5
%
1
.2
3
%
C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
a
le
n
d
er
Y
ea
r
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
v
in
ce
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
C
o
h
o
rt
-S
p
ec
iﬁ
c
T
im
e
T
re
n
d
s
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-C
o
h
o
rt
F
E
X
X
Y
ea
r-
b
y
-P
ro
v
in
ce
F
E
X
X
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
.
C
o
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
).
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
)
th
e
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
a
re
re
p
la
ce
d
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
a
n
d
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
y
-E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
N
o
t
b
ei
n
g
d
el
ay
ed
a
t
sc
h
o
o
l
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
ta
k
es
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
if
th
e
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
ch
il
d
m
in
u
s
y
ea
rs
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
p
lu
s
6
is
g
re
a
te
r
th
a
n
ze
ro
.
T
h
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
g
a
p
is
d
eﬁ
n
ed
b
y
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
p
lu
s
6
m
in
u
s
a
g
e.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
49
T
a
b
le
1
3
:
H
et
er
o
g
en
eo
u
s
T
re
a
tm
en
t
E
ﬀ
ec
ts
o
f
S
tr
ik
e
E
x
p
o
su
re
b
y
S
ch
o
o
l
G
ra
d
e
Y
ea
rs
o
f
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
L
o
g
T
o
ta
l
H
o
m
e
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
S
o
rt
in
g
W
a
g
e
E
a
rn
in
g
s
U
n
em
p
lo
y.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
A
ll
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
1
-4
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
3
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
7
*
*
*
-2
.5
6
6
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.8
9
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
5
-7
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
1
8
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
5
-0
.0
0
1
7
*
-1
.3
6
6
8
*
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.7
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
1
-4
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
2
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
*
-1
.5
4
9
5
0
.0
0
1
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
*
(0
.0
0
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(1
.2
9
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
5
-7
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
2
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
-1
.8
0
8
8
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
8
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(1
.1
9
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
F
e
m
a
le
s
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
1
-4
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
3
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
1
-0
.0
0
3
5
*
-3
.2
6
9
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
3
*
*
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(1
.1
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
S
tr
ik
e
E
xp
o
su
re
5
-7
gr
a
d
e
-0
.0
1
2
6
*
0
.0
0
0
3
-0
.0
0
0
8
-0
.9
9
7
6
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
2
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.9
3
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
N
o
te
s:
A
u
th
o
rs
'
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
ei
r
p
re
fe
re
d
v
er
si
o
n
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
u
si
n
g
2
0
0
3
-2
0
1
5
E
P
H
d
a
ta
o
n
3
0
-t
o
4
0
y
ea
r
o
ld
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
(c
o
n
tr
o
li
n
g
fo
r
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
,
b
ir
th
y
ea
r
a
n
d
E
P
H
su
rv
ey
y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
lo
ca
l
G
D
P
a
n
d
ex
p
o
su
re
to
p
u
b
li
c
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
ri
k
es
a
n
d
in
cl
u
d
in
g
a
co
h
o
rt
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
a
n
d
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
iﬁ
c
li
n
ea
r
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
).
T
h
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
h
a
s
b
ee
n
sp
li
t
in
to
2
:
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
th
a
t
o
cc
u
r
in
g
ra
d
es
1
-4
a
n
d
th
o
se
th
a
t
to
o
k
p
la
ce
in
g
ra
d
es
5
-7
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
u
se
d
to
ca
lc
u
la
te
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
fo
r
ea
ch
b
ir
th
y
ea
r-
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r.
T
h
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
is
in
te
rp
re
t
a
s
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
o
f
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
o
se
d
to
te
a
ch
er
st
ri
k
es
fo
r
te
n
ex
tr
a
d
ay
s
d
u
ri
n
g
p
ri
m
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
l.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
ir
th
p
ro
v
in
ce
-y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
50
Table 14: Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemployed Production
Panel A: Excluding city of Bs.As.
Male -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032*** -1.7039* 0.0008** 0.0009**
(0.0063) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.9884) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Female -0.0217*** -0.0003 -0.0019 -1.9064** 0.0009 0.0027***
(0.0064) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.8684) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Panel B: Excluding province and city of Bs.As.
Male -0.0235*** -0.0012*** -0.0034*** -0.6997 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0066) (0.0003) (0.0011) (1.0091) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Female -0.0227*** -0.0004 -0.0021 -2.1205** 0.0008 0.0027***
(0.0067) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.8895) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Panel C: Excluding provinces with high migration
Male -0.0234*** -0.0013*** -0.0030*** -1.5504 0.0009*** 0.0011**
(0.0065) (0.0003) (0.0010) (1.0053) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Female -0.0228*** -0.0003 -0.0026* -2.0903** 0.0007 0.0028***
(0.0067) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.8582) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Panel D: Balanced panel (survey year greater than 2010)
Male -0.0216*** -0.0015*** -0.0023** -1.8006* 0.0008** 0.0012**
(0.0075) (0.0004) (0.0010) (1.0646) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Female -0.0203*** -0.0001 -0.0016 -1.3777 0.0009 0.0033***
(0.0065) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.9980) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Notes: Authors' estimation using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. Each column
estimates the aurhors' prefered version of equation (1) unless otherwise speciﬁed (controling for birth
province, birth year and EPH survey year ﬁxed eﬀects as well as local GDP and exposure to public
administration strikes and including a cohort-speciﬁc and a province-speciﬁc linear time trend). Panel
A exclude the City of Buenos Aires (CABA). Panel B excludes both CABA and the province of Buenos
Aires. Panel C excludes the ﬁve provinces with the highest cross-province mobility rates (Chaco,
Corrientes, Misiones, Rio Negro and Santa Cruz). Panel D eliminates pre-2010 EPH survey years to
obtain a balance panel. Panel E shows results from the falsiﬁcation test where we have reassigned the
treatment variable for cohort c to cohort c+7. Panel F incorporates province-speciﬁc linear birth year
trends to the estimation of equation (1). Panel G drops the top 1 percent of the teacher strike exposure
distribution. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations used to calculate the
averages for each birth year-birth province-year. The coeﬃcient is interpret as the eﬀect of being exposed
to teacher strikes for ten extra days during primary school. Standard errors are clustered at the birth
province-year level. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level
and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Table 14: Robustness and Sensitivity Checks (Continue)
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemployed Production
Panel E: Reassigning treatment from cohort c to cohort c+7
Male -0.0061 0.0006 0.0022 -1.7665 -0.0003 0.0002
(0.0097) (0.0004) (0.0013) (1.1931) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Female -0.0132 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0649 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0095) (0.0007) (0.0022) (1.0177) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Panel F: Including province-speciﬁc linear cohort trends
Male -0.0192*** -0.0017*** -0.0045*** -3.9414*** 0.0007* 0.0008
(0.0072) (0.0004) (0.0013) (1.2856) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Female -0.0119 0.0002 -0.0020 -2.9745*** 0.0014** 0.0037***
(0.0083) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.9408) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Panel G: Eliminating cohorts expose to >200 days of strikes (top 1%)
Male -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032*** -1.4455 0.0007** 0.0006
(0.0063) (0.0003) (0.0011) (1.0499) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Female -0.0209*** -0.0002 -0.0019 -1.9827** 0.0009 0.0028***
(0.0064) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.9098) (0.0006) (0.0009)
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Table 15: Eﬀect of controlling for non-teacher strikes and GDP
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemploy. Production
Panel A: Without controls for PA strikes and GDP
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0233*** -0.0015*** -0.0034*** -2.1796** 0.0008** 0.0006*
(0.0060) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.8811) (0.0003) (0.0004)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0176*** -0.0003 -0.0020 -2.5964*** 0.0010** 0.0029***
(0.0058) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.8065) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Panel B: With controls for PA strikes and GDP
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032*** -1.7039* 0.0008** 0.0009**
(0.0063) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.9884) (0.0003) (0.0004)
PA Strike Exposure 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0014 -2.0821 -0.0001 -0.0010
(0.0105) (0.0006) (0.0025) (1.9350) (0.0006) (0.0007)
GDP -1.4222*** -0.0355 -0.0345 -6.9421 -0.0020 0.0132
(0.4128) (0.0239) (0.0636) (75.9597) (0.0247) (0.0274)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0217*** -0.0003 -0.0019 -1.9064** 0.0009 0.0027***
(0.0064) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.8684) (0.0005) (0.0008)
PA Strike Exposure 0.0121 -0.0005 -0.0012 -3.3382** 0.0002 0.0009
(0.0133) (0.0011) (0.0025) (1.6255) (0.0010) (0.0016)
GDP -0.7139 -0.0662 -0.0531 -74.3703 -0.0049 0.0406
(0.4515) (0.0490) (0.0994) (92.1208) (0.0291) (0.0557)
Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. Panel A excludes
controls for public administration strikes and province-speciﬁc GDP. Panel B includes these controls, both deﬁned at the
time the cohorts were in primary school. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations used to calculate
the averages for each birth year-birth province-year. The coeﬃcient is interpret as the eﬀect of being exposed to teacher
strikes for ten extra days during primary school. Standard errors are clustered at the birth province-year level. *** indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Table 16: Eﬀect of local labor market conditions on teacher
strikes, 2003-2014
Teacher Strikes
(1) (2)
Unemployment rate 0.6355** 1.1255
(0.2591) (0.9366)
Average wage 0.3605 -1.8366
(0.6432) (5.0689)
Average per capita income 0.0016* -0.0072
(0.0009) (0.0061)
Days of strike in public administration X
Province FE X
Year FE X
Province-speciﬁc time trends X
R-squared 0.047 0.407
Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) using 2003-2015 EPH data and
strike data from CTI. The unemployment rate, average wages and average
per capita family income describe the labor market conditions for each birth
province-calender year cell. Column (1) regress the days of teacher strikes
during the period 2003-2015 only on labor market conditions. Column (2)
adds days of strikes in public administration, calendar year and province
ﬁxed eﬀects and province-speciﬁc time trends. Regressions are weighted
by the number of individual observations used to calculate the averages for
province-year. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The coeﬃcient is
interpret as the eﬀect of local labor market conditions to days of teacher
strikes. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance
at the 5% level and * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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